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Abstract 
Security is a very important concept in the growth and the development of the mobile agent technology. However, in most of 
researches, security properties are envisaged in the implementation phase. Nevertheless, the integration of security properties in 
all phases of software development can provide more secure mobile agents based systems. In this paper we are interested to 
model the security properties in order to protect stationary agents during their communications with visitor mobile agents.  
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1. Introduction 
A mobile agent is an agent that can move from one site to another to approximate data or resources. It moves with 
its own code and data, but also with its execution state. The agent autonomously decides its movements1. The 
security of mobile agents creates a problem that is not yet fully resolved; hence the focus on the mobile agent 
technology has been reduced. A careful analysis of software development process shows that the definition of 
security properties are considered in the implementation phase, while the integration of security requirements during 
all phases of development could assist in the development of multi-agent systems more secure2.  
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In this context and in order to contribute to solve this problem, the aim of our research is to integrate the security 
properties in the design phase of the mobile agent based system development process. In this work, we are interested 
essentially to secure stationary agents during their communications with visitor mobile agents by introducing new 
security concepts in the design stage. These new security concepts represent new extensions of the MA-UML profile 
(Mobile Agent UML)3 in order to define the “Secure MA-UML profile”. This paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 describes the security properties and the security problem of mobile agents based systems. In Section 3, we 
propose to extend the MA-UML profile3 with new modeling concepts for the design of security properties in order to 
protect stationary agents during their communications with visitor mobile agents. Then, in section 4 we will describe 
the implementation of a hotel reservation application based on mobile agents using the new proposed security 
concepts. Finally, section 5 summarizes the paper and offers directions for future work. 
2. MOBILE AGENTS AND SECURITY 
2.1. Security Properties  
Security is usually defined in terms of the existence of any of the following properties4: 
x Confidentiality: the property of guaranteeing information is only accessible to authorized entities and inaccessible 
to others. 
x Authentification: the property of proving the identity of an entity. 
x Integrity: the property of assuring that the information remains unmodified from source entity to destination 
entity. 
x Access control: The property of identifying the access rights an entity has over system resources.  
x Non-repudiation: The property of confirming the involvement of an entity in certain communication.  
x Availability: The property of guaranteeing the accessibility and usability of information and resources to 
authorized entities.  
x Secret stream: The property of preventing unauthorized users to be able to analyze the data flow.  
x Confinement: The property of ensuring that a subject cannot voluntarily disclose contents of objects to which he 
has access to someone who doesn’t have the right to access.    
2.2. Security threats in Mobile Agent System 
All The advent of the mobile agent technology poses essentially the security problems which have not been 
encountered before. During its visit, the agent interacts with other agents that can analyze or alter its content. Also 
visited host on which the agent runs has the ability to manipulate the agent or even destroying it. In the literature5 
Attacks are classified into passive and active attacks. Five risk categories are identified in the literature6, 7, which 
are: (1) Attacks between two agents: this class spread the attacks that an agent may suffer from another agent. There 
are basically four types of risks: attacks against authentication, attacks against confidentiality, attacks against 
availability and attacks against non-repudiation. (2) Attacks of the host for agents: to run an agent, the host must 
have access to its code, data and state. Thus, an agent that runs on a site is exposed to security threats which are: 
attacks against authentication, attacks against confidentiality, attacks against availability and attacks against 
integrity. (3) Agent attacks the host: in this class the problems include masquerading, denial of service, unauthorized 
access and repudiation. (4) Security between agent and external entities: to migrate to another site, an agent must 
pass through a communications network on which the agent may suffer different types of attacks such as listening, 
alteration of its content or even its destruction. (5) In addition, at the target platform, agent can be attacked by the 
user of the platform or by other agents. 
2.3. Related work 
In recent years, some studies have suggested taking into consideration the security properties at the design level. 
Some initial steps have been taken in that context. We can classify them into two categories: (1) Formal approaches: 
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this category of approaches proposed formal formalisms for security design. These formalisms are based on algebric 
process and Petri nets. Among these approaches we mention the conceptual model for systems based on secure 
mobile agents8 and formal modeling and analysis of a system based on secure mobile agents9. 
(2) Semi-formal approaches: this class of approaches has focused on the semi-formal formalisms which are 
classified into three classes. The first class of semi-formal approaches offers their own agent-oriented methodologies 
to specify the security concepts related to multi-agent systems, such as SecureTROPOS10 and NEMO11. The second 
class contains extensions of UML which are object-oriented approaches that are UMLSec12 and SecureUML13. The 
third class has defined extensions which are agent-oriented approaches such as Adaptive security model for MAS14 
and the extension of FAML15, 16. 
In our work we are interested in the second category and mainly in the last two classes of semi-formal approaches 
that rely primarily on UML language, which are UMLSec, Secure UML, the adaptive security model, and the 
extension of FAML. 
2.3.1. UML 
The UMLsec profile12 is an extension of UML to specify Security properties. UMLSec diagrams are essentially 
UML diagrams where security properties and requirements are inserted as stereotypes with tags and constraints. The 
security-relevant information added using stereotypes includes security-relevant information covering the following 
aspects: Security assumptions on the physical system level, for example the stereotype “encrypted”, when applied to 
a link in a UML deployment diagram, states that this connection has to be encrypted. Security requirements on the 
logical level, for example related to the secure handling and communication of data, such as “secrecy” or 
“integrity”. Security policies that system parts are required to obey such as “fair exchange” or “data security”. A 
system is composed of subsystems which are in turn composed of further subsystems or components that can be 
modeled in the form of class diagrams or state charts. Some of the stereotypes on subsystems refer to stereotypes on 
model elements contained in the subsystems. For example, the constraint of the “data security” stereotype refers to 
contained objects stereotyped “critical” (which in turn have tags {secret}). The UMLSec profile is a modeling 
language, allows a specification of requirements regarding confidentiality, integrity, access control, non-repudiation, 
and secret stream but it does not address the other security properties such as authentication, availability and 
confinement. 
2.3.2. SecureUML 
The SecureUML profile13 is a modeling language that defines a vocabulary to annotate UML-based models with 
relevant information for access control. It is based on the RBAC model (Role based Access Control)18 and 
specifying authorization constraints. SecureUML defines a vocabulary to express different aspects of access control 
such as roles, permissions and role assignments user-role. The objective of SecureUML is to be used as a slice of 
another modeling language, called the host language, to cover aspects of access control. The SecueUML metamodel 
is defined as an extension of the UML metamodel and RBAC concepts are represented directly as types of 
metamodel. New types are introduced into the metamodel that are: "ResourceSet" type which is used to define 
constraints authorizations and permissions. "Permission" relationship which defines a connection from one role to a 
"ModelElement" or "ResourceSet." The "ActionType" item used to classify the authorization; it represents a class of 
relevant security operations on a particular type of protected resource. The 'ResourceType' element defines all 
"ActionType" available for a particular element of the metamodel. Connection to the meta-model element is 
represented by the attribute "BaseClass", which contains the name of an element or a stereotype. 
The "AuthorizationConstraint" item expresses a precondition imposed on each call to an operation of a particular 
resource, which generally depends on the dynamic state of the resource, call, or the environment. The SecureUML 
profile is an object-oriented language which deals only with the security requirement: access control but it does not 
address the other security properties such as authentication, availability and confinement, confidentiality, integrity, 
non-repudiation, and secret stream. 
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2.3.3. Adaptive security model 
The adaptive security model16 is an extension of the RBAC model18. This work presented a security meta-model 
in which the traditional role concept has been extended. The new concept requires both security management as the 
model of access control based on roles (RBAC) and agent behavior in agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE: 
Agent Oriented Software Engineering). The basic policy of access authorization in this model takes the following 
form: Subject (id, role, and organization), Access Context (co) and Resource (id, type). 
The RBAC model has been extended with permissions to assign to individuals and organizations, the meta-model 
was justified by the requirements of the particular project "Health agents"16, but it is common in other areas and 
several applications can use. In fact, these permissions are configured by a positive authorization policy for the 
entire collection and negative authorizations for individual exclusions. The notion (Access_Context) is another 
proposed extension to give greater agility14. This work is an agent-oriented language that focuses on access control 
and not considers other security properties (confidentiality, integrity, authentication, etc.). 
2.3.4. Extensions of FAML  
FAML is a generic metamodel (FAME Agent oriented Modelling Language) to describe features of multi-agents 
systems19, 20. An extension of this meta-model is defined to integrate security concepts. This extension defines in a 
very abstract way the security requirement by classifying it in system security requirement and agent specific 
security requirement. Two extensions of the meta-model are generated15, 16 to involve security measures. These 
concepts are shown in two sets: the notions of execution time "run-time" and the concepts of design time "design-
time. The extension of FAML classifies also resource in public and private resources, and it defines also security 
action that an agent takes if an interaction gives access to resources when it shouldn’t. The modeling concepts added 
by these extensions are not satisfactory to model all the security properties also there are other security concepts that 
are more complex and can be derived. 
2.3.5. Discussion 
All these approaches previously presented are useful and interesting contributions. However, some limits are 
identified. In fact, security properties which are authentication, availability and confinement were not frequented by 
these previous works. Also, security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and secret stream 
have been treated but not enough and they can be improved. Also, these approaches are essentially object-oriented 
languages and agent-oriented languages and not mobile agent-oriented language. Then, they not consider specific 
mobile agents security properties.  
Indeed, we can say that at the present state of research progress, no design approach will allow an adequate 
specification of the security properties of mobile agents. Therefore, it is interesting to develop new extensions to 
participate in the specification and design stage of the mobile agent development process.  
3. The proposed extensions 
MA-UML3 is a UML profile which defines a set of seven diagrams (environment diagram, mobile agent diagram, 
itinerary diagram, navigation diagram, mobile agent activity diagram, life cycle diagram, and mobile agent sequence 
diagram) which describe the static and the dynamic aspects to model mobile agent’s concepts and mobile agents 
based systems. MA-UML profile has presented some extensions to model the authentication security property. 
Nevertheless, it represents a modest effort. In fact, the parameters presented are not sufficient to model the various 
security aspects of mobile agents. Our idea was to extend MA-UML profile with security properties of mobile 
agents in order to model a secure mobile agent based system. This extended version of MAUML profile is called 
"Secure MA-UML." 
The objective of this paper is the integration of security properties at the design phase of mobile agent based 
system. Then, we propose to define new extensions to model security properties in order to protect stationary agents 
during their communications with visitor mobile agents. In the following sub-sections, we present the proposed 
extensions. 
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3.1. Extensions of MA-UML Environment Diagram  
3.1.1. Extension 1 
During agent’s migration from one host to another in order to interact with other agents, it carries its code, static 
data, the data collected and its execution state. The agent behavior can change when moving and it can become a 
malicious agent. During their visits to different hosts to communicate with other stationary agents, mobile agents 
can cause denial-of service and then the availability attacks by communicating more than permitted with the 
stationary agents. Thus, this can disrupt and degrade the performances of stationary agents or damage their code, 
state or the data. To avoid these attacks, it’s necessary to control the communication properties between mobile 
agents and stationary agents resident in host. The environment diagram of MA-UML profile3 allows to specify 
entities of the mobile agent environment (visitor mobile agent, place, stationary agent, resource, mobile agent 
system and region). However, elements of this diagram can neither specify constraints on communication properties 
between agents nor prevent against denial of service and the availability. In MA-UML environment diagram, there 
is two stereotyped classes «stationary agent» and «visitor mobile agent» related by the stereotyped association 
«Communicate»). In order to specify properties communication constraints, we propose to define a new stereotyped 
class-association «PropCommunication» between the two classes «visitor mobile agent» and «stationary agent». 
This stereotyped class-association defines a set of properties that set the privileges of the visitor mobile agent when 
communicating with stationary agents of the visited host. The introduced security properties are:  
x TimeComMax: this  property defines the maximum time allowed to visitor agent to communicate with the 
resident agents. This property can guarantee the availability by eliminating the denial of service. 
x NbComMax: this  property defines the maximum number of time of communication attributed to the visitor 
agent. This property can guarantee that the mobile agent does not exploit the stationary agent more than allowed. 
x ComRights: when communication starts between two agents, the mobile agent has the right to communicate, to 
negotiate and to cooperate. Communication rights attributed to the visitor mobile agent should be well described. 
For this fact, we will introduce the property "ComRights". Based on the accompanied data with the mobile agent, 
the visited environment can decide to give the right of communication, of negotiation, or of cooperation. 
 
By introducing these properties in the stereotyped class association «PropCommunication», we proceed to 
eliminate the denial of service and then the availability attacks. 
3.1.2. Extension 2 
In order to protect stationary agents, it is necessary to establish a set of privileges that must be respected during 
the communication with the coming agents. In order to satisfy this constraint, we propose to define the stereotyped 
class «ComPermission» related to the class «stationary agent». The defined class has the following properties: 
x MaxDurAuth: this property determines the maximum time allowed to stationary agent to communicate with the 
coming agents. 
x NbComAuth: this property determines the maximum number of time of communication allowed to stationary to 
communicate with coming agents. 
x ComRightsAuthorized: this property determines the authorized communication rights to interact with the 
stationary agent. 
 
These new properties can therefore avoid denial of service attack and subsequently ensure the availability. Fig. 1 
shows the two extensions made to the MAUML environment diagram (extension 1 and extension 2) to contribute to 
the secure stationary agents when establishing communications with visitor mobile agents. 
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Fig. 1.Extensions of environment diagram to secure stationary agents during their communications 
The rules to follow corresponding to the environment diagram extensions for the stationary agent security during 
communication are: 
Rule 1: stationary agent is protected by establishing a maximum permitted duration Max Duration Authorized 
(MaxDurAuth), that the visitor mobile agent should respect. TimeComMax must be less than or equal to 
MaxDurAuth (TimeComMax <= MaxDurAuth). 
Rule 2: the stationary agent is protected by a maximum number of times of Communication Authorized 
"NbComAuth". NbComMax must be less than or equal to NbComAuth (NbComMax <= NbComAuth). 
Rule 3: a visitor mobile agent can perform only the authorized rights; it must respect the constraint ComRights 
includes in the ComRightsAuthorized. 
3.2. Extensions of MA-UML Mobile agent diagram  
Among the security properties we mention the non-repudiation. This property is to ensure that the original entity 
can be held responsible for his acts of communication. Then, it’s necessary to keep track of all the messages 
exchanged by the visitor mobile agents. In MA-UML mobile agent diagram, the mobile agent has a stereotyped 
class «history» that describes the visited places and the interactions made. We propose to refine this class through 
the specialized stereotyped class «CommunicationHistory». We added the specific stereotyped class 
«CommunicationHistory» that is transportable with the mobile agent, and other visited agents can exploit it to 
ensure more of the visitor mobile agent. In addition, this class also helps the source place to ensure the behavior of 
mobile agent and verify that it has not exchanged unauthorized messages or consumed more privileges (fig. 2). The 
stereotyped class «CommunicationHistory» includes the following properties: IDEntry: identifier of the entry; 
Bannedmessagedescription: description of the prohibited exchanged messages; Visitedplacesignature: represents the 
signature of the visited place which signaled banned messages exchanged. These properties allow presenting the 
banned messages exchanged by the mobile agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Extensions made to the environment diagram to secure the communication between two agents 
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3.3. Discussion 
We will discuss in this sub section the interests of extensions made in this work through a comparative study with 
the essential existing conceptual approaches (agents  oriented approaches),  and based on the security  properties 
related to the communication .We summarize this study through the following points: 
x Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentification: In our work, we have not designed these security properties, we 
admit that these aspects of security are to consider in the implementation phase. 
x Availability: In our contribution, we have proposed to add four attributes which are:  « MaxDurAuth », 
« NbComAuth », « TimeComMax » et « NbComMax », these four attributes contribute to satisfy the availability 
aspect of stationary agent.  
x Non-repudiation:  In our work, we proposed the 'CommunicationHistory' class that allows to keep track of all the 
prohibited messages. 
x Access control: In our work, we proposed the two attributes 'ComRights' and 'ComRightsAuthorized ', these two 
attributes set the rights assigned to the mobile agent to communicate with the stationary agent. This allows the 
satisfaction of the access control aspect. 
 
In order to illustrate the use and to validate the new proposed extensions defined in the context of “Secure 
MAUML” profile; we propose to apply these new extensions for modeling and implementing some scenarios of 
hotel reservation application based on mobile agents. In the following sub-sections, we describe the scenarios 
descriptions, their modeling through some diagrams and the description of the implementation.  
3.4. Application description 
Our proposed hotel reservations application based on mobile agents is composed of: 
Customer: a person who wishes to book a hotel that suits their needs by filling out a form that presents its 
requirement. 
Customer Agent (CA): it’s a mobile agent that will be created after a customer completes a form, it will be filled 
on hotels that suits their requirements.  
Hotel Reservation Agent (HRA): it’s a mobile agent that will migrate for hotel booking. It will communicate with 
hotels agents to inquire about the availability of a room and the price of one night, after it will choose the most 
adequate to their needs. 
Hotel Agent (HA): an agent who represents hotels with which hotel reservation agent can communicate by 
migrating from a hotel to another to communicate on price, availability, etc.  
A scenario of the system can be summarized in the following points:  
(1) The customer fills out a form that contains the data needed for the booking of the desired hotel and sending 
the Customer Agent (CA) to the service (hotel services).  
(2) Upon receiving the CA, the HRA will be created. 
(3) The customer agent presents all relevant hotels specified by the customer. These hotels represent the itinerary 
of the Hotel Reservation Agent (HRA). 
(4) The HRA will follow the itinerary by migrating to communicating with every Hotel Agent. The Fig. 3 shows 
the model of our system. 
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Fig. 3: The architecture of the hotel reservation application 
3.5. Application’s scenarios modeling 
We propose to model some scenarios of a hotel reservation application. This modeling is based on the standard 
UML, MA-UML language3 and new defined extensions. This modeling specifies the security aspects relating to 
stationary agent’s communications and the treat the security requirement: non-repudiation, availability, and access 
control. 
3.5.1. Environment diagram modeling 
For example in our application, we consider that the hotel reservation agent choose three hotels which it should 
visit them according to the request received. Also, we assume that the hotel reservation agent cannot negotiate or 
cooperate with the hotel agent; it can only communicate with him (fig. 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Extended environment diagram of the hotel reservation application 
3.5.2. Protocol diagrams modeling 
In this sub-section, we present the protocol diagrams describing the security of HA (stationary agent) during its 
communication with the HRA (visitor mobile agent). Fig. 5 (a) shows the Protocol diagram corresponding to the 
control of the number of times of communication between the HRA and the HA. Upon the arrival of the HRA, the 
HA accesses to the database and checks whether the HRA has the right to communicate. Two possible cases arise: 
x If HRA is not allowed to communicate with the AH because the HRA exceeded the number of times of 
communication allowed for it, then the HA refuses to interact with the agent. 
x If HRA is authorized to communicate with the HA, then the HA agrees to interact with the HRA. 
Fig. 5 (b) shows the protocol diagram corresponding to the control of the communication time between the HRA 
and HA. During the communication, the HA checks whether the HRA exceeded or not the communication limit 
time. Two possible cases arise: 
x If HRA has exceeded the maximum time of communication with the HA, then the HA stops communicating. 
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x If HRA has not exceeded the maximum time of communication, then the HA continues the communication. 
Fig. 5.(a). Protocol diagram corresponding to the control of the number of times of communication between the HRA and HA, (b) Protocol 
diagram that corresponds to control the communication time between the HRA and HA. 
3.6. Application’s scenarios implementation 
For the implementation, we have used the Jade platform21 and especially the Jade Security plug-in, the Java 
programming language. We have implemented two scenarios. The goal of scenario 1 is to show the aim of the 
defined properties “NbComMax” and “NbComAuth” to ensure the availability of HA. As an example, we consider 
that the HRA has the right to communicate with the HA resident in the Golden hotel twice (NbComMax=2) and it is 
forbidden to communicate with him anymore. If HRA wants to communicate with the HA for a third time, a safety 
notification is displayed (Fig7 (a)). The target of scenario 2 is to show the aim of new properties "TimeComMax" 
and "MaxDurAuth", to ensure the availability of HA. As an example we consider that the HRA begins a 
communication with the HA in Golden hotel. Once the maximum communication time is reached, the HA interrupts 
the communication with the HRA (Fig7 (b)). 
Fig. 7. (a). Security notification indicating the interdiction of a third communication between HA and HRA, (b) Security notification indicating 
the interruption of a communication with HRA. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we are interested in the design of security aspects during the communication between a mobile agent 
and a stationary agent. These new extensions are integrates in the Secure MA-UML profile. These extensions allow 
the insurance of security aspects such access control, non-repudiation, denial of service and availability. These new 
extensions represent new properties that help monitoring the behavior of the mobile agent when moving to 
communicate with a stationary agent preventing it from running if the mobile agent became malicious. This work 
opens several perspectives, and future work can be considered. In this paper we present new extensions related to 
the agent security in mobile agents based systems, in which we have dealt only with the requirements of security: 
access control, non-repudiation, integrity and availability. An improvement of this model can be achieved by taking 
into account other security requirements. Also, other extensions can be defined to enhance the profile "Secure MA-
UML", taking into account other attacks: attack of the host for agents, agent attacks the host, security between agent 
and external entities.  
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